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HARRY KALVEN, THE PROUST OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Lee Bollinger* 
A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA. By 
Harry Kalven, Jr. (edited by Jamie Kalven). New York: Harper & 
Row. 1988. Pp. xxxii, 698. $35. 
Reading A Worthy Tradition makes one nostalgic. For the genera-
tion of scholars who cut their first amendment teeth on Harry 
Kalven's articles, this book offers the experience of a recaptured past. 
The question is, however, does it offer anything more? 
I 
All the marks of Kalven's irresistible style of scholarship are here. 
The discussion is about cases, and really only Supreme Court cases. 
The opinions are described in careful, even loving, detail, sometimes 
accompanied by long quotations, but always evidencing Kalven's re-
markable capacity for synthesis of argument. His approach is docu-
mentary: the focus is literally on the building of a tradition, of a 
jurisprudence, through Supreme Court decisions. Kalven clearly has a 
romance with the Warren Court, but that is because he adores the 
spirit that animates the conflicts between the Justices of that Court, 
not because it was the Court of Justice Black, whom Kalven seems to 
admire above all others. His enthusiasm for detailed case analysis 
seems to diminish noticeably as the Burger Court emerges. 
Kalven's approach is also distinctly non-interdisciplinary. No-
where is the legal analysis disturbed by references or even citations to 
the insights of philosophers, social scientists, or political theorists 
(with the one exception of John Stuart Mill); and the reader most as-
suredly is never asked to do business with those traders of complex 
thought such as structuralism, deconstruction, or contemporary conti-
nental philosophy. 
In general, the book seems to deliberately shy away from large is-
sues of social organization. Kalven is self-effacing and modest before 
the big questions. At the very beginning of the book, for example, he 
describes the elements of the "broad consensus on the kinds of 
messages the government should leave alone" (p. 6), and he observes 
approvingly that heresy and blasphemy are clearly outside the realm 
of law to regulate. He then wonders: "Perhaps we would all be hap-
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pier in a society with more religion and less free speech." But he 
quickly closes the discussion by disclaiming, "That is an issue I am not 
equipped to argue" (p. 7). 
On the other hand, the book is not wholly devoid of grand ideas; 
but they emerge in the essential intellectual vision through which the 
free speech tradition is fashioned. The ideas are now familiar and rela-
tively straightforward. Freedom of speech is fundamental to demo-
cratic self-government. At the core of free speech, therefore, as New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 1 profoundly recognized, is the idea that 
sedition is a constitutionally untenable category of speech. The scope 
of free speech protection radiates, outward from that understanding: 
The state is not to be trusted. While some weighty state interests re-
quire recognition of limits on free speech, the Court's task is to keep 
those to a minimum, and to follow a general policy of overprotection 
of speech. That policy flows from a belief that the harms of protected 
"bad" speech are far less than the harms of losing "good" speech 
when official regulation cuts too close to the first amendment bone. 
With this simple vision, Kalven approaches case after case, ever-
interested in its detail and in its proper resolution. Small is indeed 
beautiful in Kalven's world, significance resides in the particular. 
Cases that seem unimportant are invested with high meaning. Thus, 
Cohen v. California 2 is a "nominally trivial and faintly embarrassing 
controversy," but Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court "exemplifies 
the best of the judicial tradition as to the First Amendment" (p. 15). 
Venturing inside the Justices' decisioruriaking process yields for 
Kalven insights about that process not obtained by lesser scholars. In-
itially, he complains of the Justices' many methods of avoiding impor-
tant issues: "[C]onstitutional principles would be more firmly 
perceived by the legal community, and the public generally," Kalven 
chides, "if the justices would be a little less clever and statesmanlike, 
and would agree to confront and decide important constitutional 
points which are fully upon them and on which there is no disagree-
ment among them" (p. 12). Yet Kalven clearly enjoys knowing the 
law from the inside. Of obscenity's definition that it be "utterly with-
out redeeming social importance," Kalven is confident that it "evi-
dences not a preoccupation with ridding society of the worthless in 
speech but rather a shrewd tactic for limiting the regulation of the 
obscene" (p. 19). This serves also as "evidence ... that the Court is a 
political institution with its own strategies in a practical world" (p. 
19). Or, of Justice Jackson's dissent in Kunz v. New York, 3 which 
Kalven sees as missing the real point of the majority decision, Kalven 
suggests that Jackson's elegant but ultimately beside the point dis-
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
3. 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
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course may have resulted from "a tension that developed during the 
judicial conference on the case .... " (p. 87). 
In this painstaking elaboration of the cases, Kalven's beautiful and 
clever phrasing surfaces just often enough to forestall monotony and 
to excite renewed interest. Here are a few samples: 
"It is a paradox of modem life that speech, although highly prized, 
enjoys its great protection in part because it is so often of no concern 
to anyone. To an almost alarming degree, tolerance depends not on 
principle but on indifference" (p. 6). 
On obscenity: "This unlikely issue has proved uniquely stubborn 
and resistant. The Court has been handicapped by a treacherous polit-
ical undertow: The justifications for obscenity regulation may be faint, 
but the political passions invested in the issue are fierce" (p. 34). "In-
deed, the idea of regulating obscenity by law while permitting case by 
case challenges in the courts sometimes seems like an invention of the 
Devil designed to embarrass and unhinge the legal system" (p. 34). 
On close judicial scrutiny of loyalty oaths: "To subject a hypocriti-
cal ceremony to a hypercritical reading strikes me as not a bad form of 
justice at all" (p. 353). 
II 
Yet, despite these enormous strep.gths of analysis and style, the big 
question to be asked about A Worthy Tradition is what its future is, or 
should be. Given the enormous effqrt that Jamie Kalven has expended 
in rescuing the manuscript from oblivion, which as nearly everyone 
knows was seriously incomplete at Harry Kalven's death, the question 
is somewhat awkward. But it must be faced, not the least because 
nearly everyone will ask it. 
That A Worthy Tradition will become merely a period piece at best, 
or a forgotten-because-outdated treatise at worst, are not implausible 
answers to this difficult question. The first amendment "tradition" is 
covered only partially. What has been long understood as the "core" 
of the first amendment - Schenk4 to Brandenberg, 5 obscenity, hostile 
audience, fighting words - is addressed in depth, as are areas tradi-
tionally regarded as of lesser interest: loyalty oaths, limitations on the 
speech of public employees, immigration, and legislative investiga-
tions. However, doctrines like prior restraint, time, place and manner 
regulations, and symbolic speech are neglected, as are many areas of 
first amendment law like broadcast regulation and commercial speech. 
Although the free speech "tradition" which Kalven so elegantly 
describes continues, and although that tradition still includes many of 
the cases laid out in this book, a nearly two-decade-old synthesis 
4. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
5. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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would seem unlikely to remain interesting for very long. The book is 
not without new concepts and ideas, but the knowledgeable reader 
would probably say that many were already incorporated (and in 
many cases more fully developed) in Kalven's earlier writings. That is 
particularly true, for example, of the discussion of libel law and New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 
To be sure, every now and then some novel tests are proposed. 
About obscenity, for example, Kalven .suggests a distinction from 
other speech: "In my view," he says, "the Court in Roth [6] f~ed to 
perceive that obscenity deals not with ideas but with stimuli to the 
imagination, with imagery anct fantasy. It therefore attempted to ac-
commodate the regulation of the obscene with the non-regulation of 
ideas generally."7 And with respect to very offensive ideas and_ the 
threat of the violent response from a hostile audience, the issue in Ter-
minie/lo v. Chi<;ago, 8 he proposes consideration of a "middle ground," 
between full protection a.Q.d official discretion to int~rrupt the speech: 
There may be implicit in a situation like Ter(niniello .a kind of second- . 
class speech which is generally permissible bu~ which is not sq val~able ... 
that the right to utter it will be protected regardless of the, likely impact 
on a hostile audience. But, if so, we are back full circle to JustiCe Rob-
erts's insistence in Cantwell [9] that, if there are such categories of 
speech, the legislature must locate and evaluate them. [pp. · 85~86] 
But, if the truth be told, the book leaves these·ideas almost totally 
undeveloped. , 
But then, Kalven's interest is· not in hew major first amendment 
theories but in offering hisjudgment about how each case should have 
been decided, how the tradition should have been developed. · With 
keen appreciation of the difficulties and burdens shouldered by any 
judge, Kalven nevertheless frequently urges the Court to give speech 
more protection. For example, Kalven's objection to Feiner v. New 
York, 10 which let a.hostile audience override the ~peaker, begins with a 
sympathetic appreciation of the Court's dilemma. He wonders 
whether "we may be asking the police to perform an impossible task 
- not merely to allow freedom for the thought they hate but to go 
down fighting on the side of the utterer of that thought." And he 
wonders whether the Court "can really supervise the norm," given 
that it is "so far from the street comer" (p. 92). But then Kalven's 
passion for free speech firms and he is resolute. He says that "under-
writing broad police discretion" here "seems wrong." "The Court 
should not underestimate its symbolic and educative role. It can affect 
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
7. P. 18. See also p. 41. 
8. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
10. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
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the attitude and training of the police, and it can influence the popular 
attitude, which in turn will affect the police." Concluding that keep-
ing the forum of the streets open is "central to the dynamics of dissent 
among free men," he proposes his solution: "The police must make a 
serious effort to keep order before silencing the speaker; and the 
Supreme Court must remain open to review of that effort" (p. 92). 
And then there is Kalven's elegant summary at the end of his dis-
cussion of the hostile audience, or as he calls it "reflexive disorder," 
problem: 
In the end, the Court's hesitation to commit itself further on princi-
ple in this area may reflect not only the intransigence of the reflexive 
disorder issue in a turbulent, real world but also a certain political 
shrewdness in keeping its options open. As the dramatis personnae have 
changed over the past three decades from Jehovah's Witnesses to Young 
Progressives to crypto-fascists to Negro civil rights groups to anti-Viet-
nam protestors, there has been abundant indication that street corner 
speech remains close to a vital nerve in the society and that it is treacher-
ous to attempt to classify with finality the form the reflexive disorder 
problem is likely to assume when protest takes to the streets. [p. 118] 
Different people will find different things to object to in Kalven's 
analyses, but the objections probably will take a similar form, which is 
that Kalven's analysis is too slight for modem scholarly tastes. Some, 
perhaps most, will object to the slipperiness, or the incompleteness, of 
Kalven's doctrinal lines. He can seem to evade difficult problems. 
How should the Court perform its "symbolic and educative role," as-
suming one exists? What, after all, will constitute a "serious effort" by 
the police to protect a speaker? And just how should the Court "re-
main open to review" those decisions of the police? 
I am far less troubled by this side of the free speech equation and 
far more troubled by Kalven's under-appreciation of the "state inter-
est" side for limiting or restricting speech. I detect two problems here. 
One is the sense he creates, by continually speaking of "state inter-
ests," that these interests are just those of some alien and distant gov-
ernment entity and not those of the public at large. The other problem 
is more serious: that is Kalven's frequent effort, no doubt uncon-
scious, to contain - or privatize - the nature of the "state" or "pub-
lic" interest which supports measures to limit speech behavior. 
Thus, with respect to obscenity, Kalven articulates the "state inter-
est" as "the evil of exciting the sexual fantasies of adults," in which 
"[p]resumably, the underlying concern, although contemporary 
lawmakers ... have rarely been candid enough to say so, is with mas-
turbation" (p. 34). With slight bemusement at the earnestness of regu-
latory efforts, he says "[t]he question is whether this state interest is 
sufficient, in the case of consenting adults, to justify the solemn inter-
vention of the law." To Kalven the harm of obscenity seems "faint" 
(p. 34). 
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Similarly, with respect to libel, .Kalven describes the problem as 
"how best to accommodate the individual interest in reputation and 
the public interest in unrestrained debate of public issues." 11 
In both of these instances, Kalven seems to understate seriously 
the public interest in regulation. Of course, it may be unfair to take 
today's heightened sensitivity to the social role of pornography and to 
use it to criticize someone writing in the early 1970s. But remember 
the question I am raising is the present and continued relevance of A 
Worthy Tradition. From that perspective, Kalven's discussion of ob-
scenity has a distinctly anachronistic ring to it. Likewise, the isolation 
of the injury of libel to mere "private" reputational interest seems 
strangely understated. For someone of Kalven's remarkable sensitiv-
ity to the needs of a democratic society, it is an odd lapse not to raise 
the question of what kind of democratic society will result from lifting 
the legal fetters on defamatory statements. 
To be sure, Kalven is not wholly unaware of the larger public val-
ues put at risk by various kinds of speech. Though at various points 
he characterizes the "reflexive disorder" cases as merely threatening a 
public interest in "order," Kalven does give a quite sensitive portrayal 
of Justice Jackson's powerful dissent in Terminiel/o, in which Jackson 
discusses the larger political consequences of extremist speakers: 
First, the situation may be one which is being manipulated as a con-
scious strategy of inducing disorder, even against the speaker. This is 
the dilemma posed by contemporary tactics of confrontation designed to 
trick "the system" into overreacting, thereby precipitating disorder and 
disenchantment. Second, the speech must be placed in the context of 
tensions that exist at the moment the speaker chooses to speak or to 
continue speaking; the speaker may inherit a situation in which further 
speaking will be the trigger of disorder. . . . Third, in a tense situation 
with factions in the audience, language which is neutral in form may 
take on meaning as incitement. [p. 85] 
For Kalven, Jackson deserved credit "for properly sobering the issue" 
(p. 85), which Jackson did yet again in his dissent in Kunz v. New 
York But Kalven finds Jackson's fears somewhat irrelevant to the 
facts of those cases, noting that the Court in any event seemed willing 
to permit legislatures to draft statutes to guide the police officer on the 
spot, and he concludes with the observation that, since legislatures 
have not bothered to enact such statutes, we must face "a point of 
principle - the worthless offending speech cannot be safely disentan-
gled" (p.88). The issues are not pursued further. 
I should note that Kalven sees incitement as presenting potentially 
serious social problems. At the outset of his discussion of subversive 
advocacy, Kalven says: "We reach here the ultimate battleground for 
free speech theory - the area in which the claims of censorship are at 
11. P. 60. See also p. 71. 
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once most compelling and most dangerous to key values in an open 
society" (p. 119). Still, when all is said and done, Kalven's sensitivities 
lean naturally in the direction of developing the free speech dimension 
of democratic self-government, not speech's threat to that value. As 
such the book is somewhat less convincing, and less contemporary, 
than one might wish. There can be, as it were, a lightness to the 
analysis. 
So what, then, is the value of this book? The simple fact is that I 
loved reading it. I know I shall return to it again and again, and I 
think I know why. 
It is too easy to lose the forest for the trees with this book. Kalven, 
as I have said, wanted to document a "tradition," and to do that he 
reasonably thought it necessary to explore in depth - indeed, as if he 
were the deciding judge - every single case. The reader, however, 
can't help wondering, as case after case rises to meet you, whether this 
book is really the first draft all authors must write before the process 
of distilling important insights and themes can begin. Whether that is 
true or not I aiµ uncertain. But I do know that the careful reader can 
unearth nuggets of insights and themes unavailable elsewhere. 
At the heart of this book is one critically important idea, which 
though frequently referred to, is in the end left somewhat inchoate: 
the history of the first amendment is a process of the law "working 
itself pure" (p. 361). Kalven seems to have in mind the idea that the 
Court's struggle through the labyrinth of cases over several decades 
was a necessary and inevitable process to develop a full-bodied first 
amendment. Living now, as we do, in that speech-secure world, 
Kalven seems to suggest, it is difficult for us to grasp both the heroism 
of that struggle a~d the complexity those problems presented to judges 
of high talent, good faith, and commitment. Just going through the 
process ourselves, he seems to think, is an education. 
It is a fundamental idea of the book that the interaction of factual 
detail with principle and theory enriches the principle and theory. 
Without detail~ ideas become bloodless and abstract, and end up hav-
ing nothing to do with anything. 12 This central thesis illustrates why 
some Supreme Court opinions are important and valuable and some 
a,ren't, and also why Kalven's own method is itself important and val-
uable. Along the way, this profound notion of knowledge and under-
standing yields comment after comment of sensitive insight: on how it 
may be important to the resolution of a particular case to minimize the 
significance of the speaker (as Holmes was frequently inclined to do), 
but how .that tactic fails to help build a tradition of respect for dissent 
(p. 156); on how the context of the dissent, with its liberation of elo-
quence from the chains of compromise that always accompany vie-
12. See pp. 3, 194. 
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tory, may have been critical to the emergence of a tradition of free 
speech (pp. 149, 158); on how remarkable it is that so much of the free 
speech tradition comes from the pens of elderly people (Holmes, 
Meiklejohn, and Brandeis were all in their seventies when they wrote 
their memorable passages on free speech) (p. 162); on how there is a 
"dialogue between the society and the Court" (p. 181), which the 
Court can usefully exploit by being generous or ungenerous toward 
legislative attempts to fashion restrictions on speech. 13 
Kalven himself is at times impatient with the wrangling. over tests. 
He complains that lawyers are often diverted into "Talmudic analysis 
of competing formulae" and overlook "the value of radical criticism of 
society" (p. 149). What's really important, he insists, is that we under-
stand the reasons why we want to protect speech; that will give far 
more protection to speech than any test. But somehow, it seems, and 
this is the intriguing thesis, the tussle with tests is what provides the 
revelation about purpose. 
Ultimately, it must be said, this book has enduring value because 
Harry Kalven was a person of remarkable judgment. Ideals are kept 
in clear vision, and the particulars of the actual world direct the analy-
sis. What might seem relevant in a broad philosophical discussion be-
comes less so in a world with a real problem to solve. There is never 
the sense that Kalven's mind is either unable or unwilling to pursue 
any line of thought, should it be raised and important. While there is 
receptivity because of problems to be solved, there is quickness in han-
dling ideas for the same reason. His analysis is always just as good, 
and often better, than the best Justice in the case. And that's in the 
end how this book should be i:ead. Kalven had earned the right to 
enter his judgments. In a better world, Harry Kalven would have 
been a Supreme Court Justice. This book makes him one. 
13. See, e.g., p. 347. 
